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A MODIFIED BELIEF THEORY OF PREJUDICE EMPHASIZING THE
MUTUAL CAUSALITY OF RACIAL PREJUDICE AND
ANTICIPATED BELIEF DIFFERENCES
RICHARD A. DIENSTBIER
University of Nebraska–Lincoln
The belief theory of prejudice introduced by M. Rokeach stated that racial prejudice is the result
of the anticipation of belief differences. The unidirectional causal relationship implied is criticized
as oversimplified. Research, supporting the belief theory is examined, with conceptual and experimental deficiencies noted. A new formulation is proposed which emphasizes mutual causality between racial prejudice and anticipated belief differences. Two studies supporting that view are presented in which belief communications were presented as tape-recorded interviews or speeches,
with the race and social class of the communicator first having been manipulated. The interrelationships between communicator’s race, specific communication topic, and subject’s prejudice level on the dimensions of felt similarity of the subject to the communicator are seen as supporting the
mutual causation formulation.

The belief theory of prejudice suggests that
prejudice results from an aversion toward individuals who hold beliefs which are incongruent with one’s own. It was postulated that
the aversion toward incompatible beliefs was
due to universal needs for consensual validation (Rokeach, Smith, & Evans, 1960) and/or
the desire for the reinforcement provided by
belief agreement (Byrne & Wong, 1962). Furthermore, belief theory proponents have suggested that without anticipations about belief differences, no prejudice would exist.

Rokeach et al. (1960), in elaborating that point in
the original formal presentation of the belief theory, asked and answered the ultimate question:
Are there two qualitatively different kinds of prejudice,
or can racial and ethnic prejudice be subsumed under
belief prejudice? The data, such as they are, seem to
yield up a primarily no answer to the first part, and primarily yes answer to the second part of the question
[p. 157].

Since that statement, a good many other researchers have interpreted their research as supporting those notions.
The purposes of this paper are several: First,
to demonstrate that the question of race versus
belief cannot be answered in the abstract, and
that any attempt at a quantitative answer to the
question of the relative strength of race and belief differences in determining prejudice is inappropriate. In order to develop the argument
leading to that conclusion, a review of the literature supporting the belief theory will be presented, discussed, and criticized. The second
purpose of this paper is to show that the interaction of belief differences and race are quite
complex and that a reformulation of the belief
theory in terms of mutual causal relations between racial prejudice and beliefs (rather than
the unidirectional relation presently in vogue) is

Study I of this paper was based on dissertation research
submitted to the Department of Psychology, University of
Rochester, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
PhD degree. Special thanks are due to my thesis advisor, Vincent Nowlis, for assistance with the research and for comments offered concerning the manuscript, and to my wife, the
interviewer in the research. Thanks are also due Allen Adinolfi, James Barron, Ed Fougerousse, and John Martinelli for
help with the audio and video work.
Study II was made possible through a Junior Faculty Summer Research Fellowship provided by the Research Council
of the University of Nebraska–Lincoln and through equipment funds provided by the Research Council. Thanks are due
to Pamela Munter and Rick Scheidt for assistance in developing the script and tapes used in that study, to Garret Fox for
assistance with the statistical analyses, and to Monte Page for
his critical reading of the manuscript.
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more appropriate. Evidence in the form of data
from two studies will be presented to demonstrate that race prejudice can exist regardless of
belief differences, and that a more complex formulation than the belief theory is indicated.

BELIEF THEORY RESEARCH
In the initial belief theory research of
Rokeach et al. (1960), stimulus individuals
were presented in a factorial design of Race ×
Belief, so that the stimulus persons were presented as (a) Negro person who agrees; (b) Negro person who disagrees; (c) white person who
agrees; (d) white person who disagrees. Agreement was manipulated by the stimulus person’s
stand on some one topic, so that most stimulus
person presentations were as short as “ A Negro who believes in God.” Topics were both
general and race relevant, including socialized
medicine, communism, labor unions, God, immediate desegregation, fraternity and sorority integration, equality of race, and integration
of neighborhoods. Prejudice was determined on
the basis of the subject’s responses to a 9-point
social-distance-type scale concerning potential
friendship. Using a factorial design of Race ×
Agreement (Belief), the data indicated that the
basic hypothesis concerning the greater power
of the belief manipulation was correct.
Almost identical stimulus person presentation methods were used by Smith, Williams,
and Willis (1967) with subject populations different in location and age from those of the
Rokeach research. Their findings generally
tended to replicate the Rokeach findings, although a high degree of racial (as opposed to
belief) discrimination was found for the Louisiana subject sample. There were, however,
several significant problems with the research.
The questionnaire was undisguised so that it
was completely obvious to subjects that race
and belief issues were being studied and that
their responses would indicate both their attitudes toward the belief issues and toward race.
Results must be interpreted, therefore, with the
recognition of the confounding of social desirability with racial prejudice mediated by the
obvious demand characteristics of the situa-
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tion. Second, in this rather artificial, situation,
subjects must make some decisions as to what
the experimenter means to imply by his stimulus materials. Does the mention of one man
as Negro and another as white imply that all
other things are equal between the two ? Although a subject could blithely develop and
accept such a premise in the context of psychological research, he might never be willing to concede the same point in real-life racial interactions. This objection also concerns
the question of whether the laboratory presentation of race-relevant materials results in subjects believing the experimenter. Suspiciousness checks have been conspicuously absent
from the bulk of the cited research. One does
not read any reports of such direct questions
as “Did you think we were looking at the influence of race on your responses ?” A rare reported occurrence of a check of any sort (Hendrick, Bixenstine, & Hawkins, 1971) asked
subjects “to describe their reactions to the experiment.” Work on postexperimental questionnaire procedures for deception experiments has suggested the advantages of direct
and specific questions following more general ones as an ideal technique for detecting true
suspicions: without eliciting false-positive reports (Page, 1971). Whether we consider the
possibility of mistaken assumptions on the part
of the subjects, or their possible suspiciousness of the experimenter’s true intent, there is
cause for serious doubt that subjects respond
to the stimulus materials in a manner which is
similar to their real-life behavior.
A second category of objection to the
Rokeach et al. (1960) and Smith et al. (1967)
studies was explicated by the research of Triandis and Davis (1965). Using stimulus person
presentation techniques similar to the Rokeach
et al. (1960) method, those authors presented
to each of 300 subjects eight stimulus persons
representing all combinations of race (white or
Negro), sex, and strong pro or anti views toward civil rights. Stimulus persons were described in short phrases such as “Male, Negro,
favors strong civil rights legislation.” Dependent measures of semantic differential and so-
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cial-distance-like behavioral differential scales
were used. From previously determined factor
structures (Triandis, 1964), the behavioral differential scales were classified into the five factors of formal social acceptance, friendship acceptance, marital acceptance, social distance,
and subordination. For the first two factors, belief differences provided the greatest influence,
while sex and race had the most impact on the
third, and the last two were most influenced by
race. These results were interpreted as suggesting that the dependent measures used determine
the relative influence of the race versus belief
influence. Other research (Dienstbier, 1970) extended those findings. For the same subjects,
while favoritism may be indicated toward minority group members (over whites) on one
scale such as “would elect to political office,”
significant negative prejudice may still be indicated on other more race-sensitive scales such
as “accept as kin by marriage.” Mezei (1971)
has since suggested that the greater influence
of race on such items as marriage acceptance
is merely due to subjects’ anticipation of social
disapproval for a more lenient stand. The Mezei
data are, unfortunately, not free from the alternative interpretation that race prejudice is very
real, and that subjects see other people as sharing their prejudice in order to defend their own
views and because (as the belief theory suggests) they want to believe that others largely
share their beliefs and values. At present, then,
it appears that certain dependent measures are
far more responsive to racial prejudice while
others are more belief sensitive. The friendship
acceptance scales of the Rokeach et al. (1960)
and the Smith et al. (1967) research and the
choice of work partner scales used in Byrne’s
research (reviewed below) are far more susceptible to belief than race influences (Dienstbier,
1970; Triandis, 1961; Triandis & Davis, 1965).
Their use, therefore, biases results toward confirmation of the belief theory.
Using a different stimulus person presentation technique, Byrne and Wong (1962) presented stimulus persons through a 26-item
checklist of attitudes, with the valence of the
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attitudes of the stimulus persons having been
derived from previously acquired self-reports
of the subjects on those same attitudes. The
stimulus persons’ attitude checklists were constructed so that attitudes were like those of the
individual subject (all responses to each item
on the same side of the 6-point scale, but not
necessarily in the same exact scale position
as chosen by the subject), or unlike those of
the subject. The checklist “of attitudes developed by Byrne concerned such topics as marriage, entertainment, religion, politics, drinking, and a Catholic president; the items do not,
according to Byrne and Wong, “reflect common elements in the Negro stereotype.” Analysis of the factorial design of two levels of
subject prejudice by two levels of race (Negro
and white) by two levels of agreement (belief)
found agreement to be the greatest source of
variance on the dependent measures-choice of
work partner and personal feeling scales.
In subsequent related research by Byrne and McGraw (1964), Stein, Hardyck, and
Smith (1965), Stein (1966), Insko and Robinson (1967), and Robinson and Insko (1969), the
attitude checklist belief manipulation method
was elaborated and applied to different subject
populations, in some cases with the addition of
such factors as age and, religious differences
attributed to the stimulus individuals. The Byrne and McGraw (1964) research used the same
checklist of attitude manipulations of belief as
the previous Byrne research. Stein et al. (1965)
and Stein (1966) used a teenager questionnaire
of about 2–5 items, a few of which were relevant to stereotypes of blacks (concerning intelligence, morality, ambition, and dancing ability). Insko and Robinson (1967) and Robinson
and Insko (1969) used many of the same belief
manipulation items of Stein’s research, adding
several items taken from the Blake and Dennis
(1943) study on Negro stereotypes. Robinson
and Insko (1969) provided a clever refinement
on the practice of making the dissimilar checklist by filling out the stimulus person’s checklist
with items scored opposite from the subject’s.
Their method involved finding what the sub-
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ject’s estimates of the typical black’s attitudes,
and returning that profile back to the subject
later, attributed once to a white and once to a
black individual. Although these studies generally attempted to disguise the true nature of the
research by suggesting to the subjects that the
stimulus individuals were real people, the attitude checklist technique still suffers under the
obvious limitation of being quite artificial, so
that applicability of results to behavior in nonlaboratory situations is quite limited.
These studies conceptualized and operationalized prejudice in a variety of ways. Although
Byrne and McGraw (1964) used only the choice
of friendship and work partner measures of the
previous Byrne research, the research of Stein
(1966) and Stein et al. (1965) used social-distance-type measures which ranged into such
race-sensitive areas as acceptance as kin by
marriage. The dependent measures of Insko
and Robinson (1967) and Robinson and Insko
(1969) included both semantic differential and
social-distance-type items.
Generally the Byrne and McGraw (1964)
research supported the belief theory predictions, as did the Stein et al. (1965) and Stein
(1966) research (on all prejudice measures except that of “accept as kin by marriage” used
in the Stein et al., 1965, research). The southern samples of the Insko and Robinson (1967)
and the Robinson and Insko (1969) studies,
however , indicated a greater degree of race
than belief prejudice on most of the social-distance-type measures which were based on Triandis’ behavioral differential factors of friendship acceptance and social distance. Semantic
differential scales generally indicated greater belief than race effects (Insko & Robinson,
1967; Robinson & Insko, 1969).
Other experiments, which were designed
to test the belief theory but which used stimulus person presentation techniques different
from those described above, did not provide
uniform support for the belief theory. Triandis (1961) presented stimulus individuals by
religious, occupational, and racial labels, asking each subject to imagine the stimulus indi-
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vidual to be of the same or different philosophy as the subject. Results did not support the
belief theory, instead they indicated race to
be the most important variable in determining
prejudice on a variety of social distance scales
(in contrast to similarity of philosophy, religion, and occupation). In three separate experiments, Rokeach and Mezei (1966) had subjects interact with four confederates, two of
whom (one white and one Negro) agreed with
the subject and two of whom disagreed (on
topics not directly relevant to race or race-stereotype issues). Using the subject’s choice of
two coffee partners or two work partners as a
measure of attraction toward the confederates,
the experimenters were able to determine that
more choices were made on the basis of ) belief alone than of race alone. Frequent choices of partners in combinations which could not
be attributed to race or belief similarity, however, limit the degree to which those results
can be interpreted as supportive of the belief theory. In a study similar in conception to
that of Rokeach and Mezei (1966), Hendrick
et al. (1971) presented subjects with a videotape sequence of two whites and two blacks
discussing the issue of the Vietnam war. Using measures of felt similarity, liking, and trait
ratings as prejudice indexes, the authors found
that the actors’ race had much weaker effects
than their position on the war issue, concluding: “The results of the study provide substantial support for the Rokeach et al. theory [p.
255].” “In fact, race may not be a very important variable at all [italics added, p. 257]” in
determining attraction. The authors note, however, that those conclusions do not extend to
such measures as the “date my sister” social
distance item used in their research (which
showed large race effects).
Although the Rokeach and Mezei (1966)
and Hendrick et al. (1971) studies used mote
lifelike presentations of the stimulus individuals and their communications than did the other reviewed studies, Rokeach and Mezei (1966)
used dependent measures which are more sensitive to belief manipulations, as described above,
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and both studies used communications devoid
of race-relevant content. With respect to this
last issue, there is little value in manipulating
belief issues which have nothing to do with racial stereotypes and prejudice. If white Americans feel antipathy toward black Americans
based on assumptions about the blacks’ beliefs,
those beliefs will not as likely be beliefs about
the Vietnam war as about ambition, morality,
cleanliness, dependability, etc. The race prejudice reduction achieved in the several studies which have used belief issues irrelevant to
racial prejudice and stereotypes have probably
achieved that reduction partly because student
subjects are generally somewhat reluctant to
make responses which appear prejudiced, partly because their initial level of race prejudice
might be very low, and partly because they may
make unwarranted assumptions about the stimuli toward which they should respond.
The differences in findings between researchers using different techniques to manipulate independent variables naturally provide
the stuff of controversy. Logically, there appear
to be an unlimited number of ways in which
either race or belief information could be manipulated, making dubious the conclusions of
studies which purport to show that one class
of variables is more powerful than the other.
Some researchers in the area have been aware
of this problem, though such awareness has
not always been apparent in titles which have
ranged from “Two kinds of prejudice or one?”
(Rokeach et al., 1960), and “Race and belief:
An open and shut case” (Stein et al., 1965), to
“Race versus belief similarity as determinants
of attraction : A search for a fair test” (Hendrick et al., 1971). Responding to the logical
demands of the situation, Byrne (see Byrne &
Irwin, 1969), who had himself once been in
the thick of the controversy, concluded that the
question of relative strength could not be meaningfully answered. As indicated in the review
above, however, the debate was subsequently
taken up by Hendrick et al. (1971), who concluded that finally they had the “fair test,” so
that “while assessment of relative power is dif-
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ficult, the question is certainly not meaningless.” This test was achieved through “approximately equating . . . intuitively” the relative
strength of the two independent variables.

ALTERNATE FORMULATIONS
TO THE BELIEF THEORY
Although the logical problem of the relative
strength of factorially presented race and belief manipulations is serious, other aspects of
the belief theory and its Supporting research
are also weak. The explication of these problems will be aided by the consideration of a
more complex view of prejudice presented by
Allport (1954) six years before the advent of
the belief theory. Allport defined prejudice as
“an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization.” Within the definition itself, there is no clue as to the origins of that
antipathy, but Allport suggested that the bases
are legion, including fear of strangeness, felt
needs to justify discriminatory or economic
practices, various ego-defense needs often associated with guilt, and ego-defense functions
of projection and displacement. Often too,
prejudice was conceived by Allport to result
from the child simply imitating the antipathies
of the parents. It is apparent that Allport’s understanding of prejudice is not completely harmonious with belief theory notions. Whereas Allport suggested that the negative beliefs
about an ethnic group might result from negative feelings which themselves may exist for
any number of reasons, Rokeach et al. (1960)
suggest rather unequivocally that the causal sequence is the opposite—prejudice results
from perceived belief differences. Thus, while
the first view sees prejudice as having complex causal roots, with feelings and beliefs being complexly related in mutually supportive
relationships, the belief view attempts to explain prejudice on a far simpler basis and implies a simpler view of man.
The unidirectional belief theory view of
“prejudice from anticipated belief differences” implies that information presented to cor-
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rect belief misconceptions should result in
prejudice being monotonically reduced. But
social observation suggests that this may not
occur. There are numerous examples of minority populations existing for years within
majority cultures with no changes in the majority’s often inaccurate stereotypes. One example of this phenomenon is the persistence
of the myth of Negro male sexual prowess so
popular in the South (Dollard, 1937). It seems,
then, that ‘some erroneous beliefs that are the
cause of racial prejudice (to follow the causal relationships espoused by the belief theories) are not easily changed by contradictory
day-to-day evidence. This suggests that these
beliefs, being especially resistant to change,
might serve some psychological needs of their
own that they might result from needs to bolster and justify prejudice (affect) and discrimination which, in turn, might serve a multitude
of economic, political, personality, and/or social status needs (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik,
Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Allport, 1954).
The question of which comes first, the affect
(prejudice) or the cognitive support (stereotype,
or beliefs about beliefs) is a debatable issue, but
might best be resolved by admitting to mutual
causal relationships between the variables, especially, of course, if those mutual relationships
can be demonstrated. It is curious that this type
of controversy develops in modern psychology.
In the abstract, most of us agree that most psychological processes conceptualized at the level
of cognition and affect seldom occur in unidirectional causal relationships, but involve instead complex feedback and interaction. Often,
however, when a theorist demonstrates one side
of that loop as his area of special interest, he is
engaged in debate by others who choose to emphasize the opposite part of the loop; this eitheror-type debate tends to becloud the issues. To
return to the specific issue, it may, indeed, be
quite appropriate to suggest that the anticipation
of belief differences causes prejudice, but if we
were to stop there, other important and complicating relationships might well be missed. Data
presented in this paper indicate that prejudice

151

causes the anticipation of belief differences.
That opposite causal relationship does not negate the belief view; we should visualize a relationship of mutual influence between antipathy
and expectancies about beliefs.

A THEORETICAL RESOLUTION
The theoretical position of this paper then, is
as follows: While research supporting the belief theory indicates that prejudice is based on
or caused by the anticipation of belief differences, certain real-life observations and other
psychological evidence suggest that some other complicating factors influence the dynamics of prejudice. The research reviewed above,
which has often been cited as providing apparent evidence for the belief theory (Insko, 1967;
Kirscht & Dillehay, 1967), fails to withstand
this argument both on the logical grounds explicated above and because certain critical complicating factors, present in real life, have been absent from those research efforts.
It could be argued that the intent of all psychological laboratory research is to isolate certain critical variables from the complications
of real life, and that our conclusions are always
tempered by an implied “all other things being
equal.” This is a justifiable approach, but it requires that when we interpret the significance
of our findings for the real world, we temper them with the qualifications that they have
come from relatively artificial and contrived situations. This tempering has not been applied to
the belief theory research. The belief theory researchers, having investigated prejudice from
few limited paradigms, have stacked the experimental deck to prove that belief differences account for it all. The two experiments presented
in this paper are an attempt to demonstrate how
one might “unstack” such experiments by using belief information which is very relevant to
race, by presenting that information in a more
real-life-like context, and by using dependent
measures which provide abroad range of prejudice indexes. Even when all this is done, of
course, it is still illogical to try to assess the relative influence of race and belief.
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The hypothesis underlying the research of
this paper is simply that it is not possible to
consider realistic and racially relevant belief
manipulations to be independent of the race
manipulations; these two types of variables are,
when realistically presented, interactive. And
that interaction is extremely (perhaps hopelessly) complex. As information is received, the degree it will be differentially interpreted by different listeners will depend on the manner of
information presentation (is interpretation possible, or is a checklist of attitudes provided), the
specific nature of the information (does the listener have race-relevant preconceptions concerning this specific topic), the salience of the
race differences (did the term “Negro” appear
on a form, or has one seen the individual or
heard his voice), and the prejudice level of the
listener. The research discussed in this paper
was designed to illustrate part of this complexity-to demonstrate that a communicator’s race
and communicated information do interact, or
that the manipulation of race influences the interpretation of information.
Consider again the research which has been
applied to the question of race versus belief.
The two paradigms which have I tended to
consistently support the belief theory (the
simple statements of Rokeach et al., 1960,
and the attitude checklist technique originated by Byrne & Wong, 1962) both used belief presentation techniques which permitted
the subjects very limited latitude for interpretation. Had that information been presented in a more life-like or equivocal form, it
would have been I more possible for the subjects’ race prejudices to have influenced their
understanding, of interpretation of the information, with the result that relatively greater proportions of the variance in those studies
would have been contributed by race variables. The possibility that the results might
be quite different when information presentation techniques are different, perhaps more
lifelike, will become more evident with the
presentation of the data of this paper.
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RESEARCH SUPPORTING A MORE
COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP
These data were derived from two separate
research efforts, the first conducted with middle-class women in Rochester, New York, the
second with university students in Lincoln, Nebraska. Although the first study was a complex
study concerning a variety of questions pertaining to prejudice, only that portion of its data
relevant to the present issue and to the Lincoln
study is discussed.
The hypothesis of the first study was that if
an individual were overheard talking about himself, and about his beliefs, the degree to which
subjects would rate their beliefs as similar to
the speaker’s would depend on both the apparent race and class of the speaker. Since the results of that research influenced the development
of the second study, a preview of the results of
the first is necessary here. While lower-class
status of the communicator resulted in the subjects’ seeing their views as being less similar to
the communicator across most belief issues discussed, race had a much more variable effect, obviously interacting with the specific belief issue,
sometimes influencing the listener toward greater agreement with the black speaker (compared
to the white communicator), but sometimes influencing in the opposite direction. This finding,
that agreement with the stimulus individual appears to result from an interaction of the specific belief issue with race, is similar to other findings (Dienstbier, 1970) that race interacts with
the specific social-distance-type item used to assess prejudice. Thus, either positive or negative
bias might be evidenced by the same subject toward a black stimulus individual, depending on
the specific belief issue (as indicated by the present research) or the specific prejudice measure.
The specific finding from the first study
which inspired the second concerned the communicator’s discussion of integration. His very
conservative statements (“I think it’s too early for black people and white people to live together”) found greater subject agreement by
the white subjects of that study if the speaker
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were perceived as black than if white. The second study was an attempt to determine whether
more radical racial information (a black-power speech) would be more consistently threatening from a black than a white communicator. In
the second study, as in the first, the dependent
measures indicated how similar the listener perceived his own attitudes to those expressed by
the racially labeled communicator.

STUDY I
Method
Subjects. The 74 women who participated in this experiment
were drawn from a women’s club for newcomers to the Rochester area. Subjects were all white and generally from middleclass backgrounds; most were between 25 and 40 years old. The
subjects volunteered to participate in this research in return for
the experience gained from such participation and for a lecture
on sex from Vincent Nowlis. Subjects were randomly assigned
to the four conditions of the experiment.
Design and procedure. After being randomly assigned to
one of four areas in a 360-seat auditorium, instructions were
read to all four experimental groups simultaneously. Those instructions informed the subjects that they were to participate in
two studies, one of the effect of “TV blurriness” on mood, the
other concerning the evaluation of an (audio only) interview.
The subjects were told that the person who was the subject
of the silent video sequence was the same person whom they
would subsequently hear interviewed. It was explained that it
would be helpful to know what the interviewee looked like in
order to be able to visualize him during the interview; since the
video-blurriness study was to have been done anyway, the subjects were told that it was time-saving for the experimenter and
the subjects to have the interviewee in the video sequence.
The subjects then filled out a Mood Adjective Check List
(MACL: Nowlis, 1965), saw the one-minute video sequence
which differed for each of the four groups, and filled out a
second MACL. Curtains erected in the auditorium allowed
subjects to see only the one TV set in front of their group.
In all four video sequences the same actor was presented, dressed, and made up to appear as either white or Negro, and of apparent middle-class or lower-class status. The
race change involved grease paint and a neatly trimmed Afro
wig. The social class change involved only a clothing change
from suit to work clothes. A between-groups factorial design
of Race × Class Status was thus effected, with each subject
group seeing only one of the four TV sequences. Since the
purpose of the video was only to effect the race and class
manipulation, all four sequences were as identical in action
as possible, consisting of a dull sequence of the man entering a room and sitting down.
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Since all the subjects in each group had been led to believe
that they saw the same stimulus individual as had the other
subject groups (the TV sequences supposedly differing only
in blurriness), it was possible to present the same (audio only)
tape-recorded interview of the stimulus individual to all subjects simultaneously. The interview was presented as being a
training interview of a male stimulus individual by a female
counseling student.
Pretests of the TV sequences on another population indicated that the actor was adequately convincing as either a
black or white man. (A great deal of selecting and pretesting was required to find a man whose voice was believable as
black or white.) A postexperimental check on the suspiciousness of the subjects on that aspect of experimental credibility
was also conducted.
The interview lasted about 15 minutes, with topics discussed by the interviewee ranging from interpersonal relationships with family and friends to more abstract questions
concerning political participation, crime, rioting, and integration. Generally, the interviewee was rather dull and negative.
Following the interview, all subjects answered scaled items
which pertained to the felt similarity of their beliefs to those
expressed by the stimulus individual. The purpose of the similarity items was to measure the subject’s felt similarity to the
beliefs expressed by the interviewee. Subjects were asked to
“Please rate the man who was interviewed, Mr. Jackson, on
the similarity of his views to your own.” The instructions
stressed that “In all cases, you will find it possible to answer
the questions from your memory of your impressions of the interview you heard.” Sixteen concepts that had been discussed
in the interview were rated, including occupational ambition
and stability, marriage fidelity, cleanliness, honesty, loyalty to
friends, adequacy of encouragement for his children, educational ambition, economic wisdom, political interest, reasonableness of advocated criminal punishment, balance of views
on rioting and integration, and the degree to which he drank,
was religious, and superstitious. Each concept was rated on a
7-point scale with polar dimensions of “identical” and “opposite.” Following the last of these scales, one scale asked the
subjects to rate the overall similarity of their beliefs to those
of the stimulus individual.
Following written instructions on their use, 13 modified behavioral differential items (Triandis, 1964) representing factors of formal social acceptance, friendship acceptance,
social distance, and subordination were included. These were
presented in the same 7-point form previously described, with
polar concepts of “would” and “would not.”
The behavioral differential scales were followed by a 7item updated Ethnocentrism Scale (Adorno et al., 1950) taken from the “Other Minorities and Patriotism” section of the
“suggested final form” of the Ethnocentrism Scale. Items
were updated by changing references from “zoot-suiters” to
“hippies,” from the League of Nations to the United Nations,
and from the “secret of the atomic bomb” to “military rock-
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ets” Sections pertaining to ethnic minorities were not included, since it was expected that some Jewish subjects would be
participating and since not all subjects were exposed to Negroes in the experiment, possibly resulting in differential sensitization to Negro items.
The last page of the questionnaire booklet concerned suspiciousness; subjects were asked questions ranging from general ones of whether they noticed “anything special or unusual
about the TV presentation” or about the interview, to specific
items concerning the probable occupation of the interviewee
and his race. Finally, subjects were asked to comment on the
overall goals of the experiment as they saw them; a series of
specific questions designed to detect suspiciousness of all critical aspects of the experiment followed.
With the completion of the questionnaires by the subjects,
the experiment was over. The major aims of the research and
the necessity for the race and status deceptions were then explained to the subjects in an extended debriefing.

Results
Of the 74 subjects who finished the experiment, 18 were eliminated for suspiciousness of
the race manipulation, gross misidentification
of the race of the stimulus individual, or the
failure to follow instructions.
Although subject attrition did not vary between conditions, the loss of subjects resulted in unequal numbers of subjects in the four
conditions of the experiment and the analyses
of variance which were performed on the scale
data were of the unweighted means type (Meyers, 1966). This design allowed the use of the
data of all the subjects who were not eliminated
for the reasons stated above.
Generally, as indicated in Table 1, the hypotheses concerning the effect of perceived
class status/on the effect of the belief material
were confirmed for 13 of the 16 belief issues (in
direction of effect, but not statistically significant), beliefs being rated more similar if attributed to the middle-class stimulus person. Statistical significance (p < .05) was found on four of
those issues concerning ambition, occupational
stability, loyalty to friends, and aspirations for
children. A composite similarity score based on
all 16 issues also showed a similar significant
class effect. All three scales which indicated a
reverse from hypothesis were nonsignificant.
Racial influences on belief similarity ratings were not as consistent. In fact, 11 of the
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16 independent belief-topic items indicated a
trend opposite to the hypothesis, with greater
rated similarity in the communicator-Negro
than in the communicator-white conditions.
The F ratio of less than 1.0 for the composite
(of all the belief-topic items) similarity score
also reflected the inconsistent race effect between the similarity scales. Of the three items
which indicated statistical significance based
on the race variable, subjects agreed more
with the white stimulus individual’s views
concerning aspirations for his children, but
more with the black individual’s views on integration and religion. Since the integration
issue is of major importance for its implications for the second study of this paper, it will
be emphasized here.
The portion of the interview pertaining to
the stimulus person’s views of prejudice was
as follows :
Stimulus individual: I think sometimes it’s too early for whites
and blacks to live together. I don’t know—sometimes—
maybe it’s too early for that, for integration.
Interviewer: But don’t you think we should try now, anyway?
Stimulus person: Sometimes it seems like we shouldn’t, I
don’t know.

The mean rating of similarity if the stimulus
person was black was 4.0, 2.7 if the person was
white (based on a 7-point scale, the higher score
indicating greater similarity).
Of the 13 behavioral differential items used
to assess social distance of the subject toward
the stimulus person, some were sensitive to race
alone (such as “Would exclude from my neighborhood” and “Would accept as a close kin by
marriage”), some to class alone (such as “Would
treat as an equal,” and “Would admire the ideas
of”) and one to both (“Would accept as a nextdoor neighbor”). Some items were sensitive to
neither race nor class.
Finally, within-condition correlations of
the Ethnocentrism Scale score for each subject with the subject’s composite similarity ratings of the stimulus individual indicated that all
such correlations were in the predicted directions, although not quite significant at p < .05.
Correlations of–.30,–.43,–.34, and .06 for communicator conditions of Negro lower class, Ne-
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gro middle class, white lower class, and white
middle class, respectively, indicate that while
subjects’ ethnocentrism tended to reduce felt
similarity with the three “minority” communicators, no such effect existed for the white-middle-class communicator.
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STUDY II
Method
Subjects. Subjects were 122 white male and female University of Nebraska basic psychology students who volunteered to participate in this study in order to partially fulfill an
experimental participation requirement.
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Design and procedure. Subjects were informed that the
procedure was an attitude measurement technique and that
they would hear a person discuss various topics on a tape;
they were then to respond by indicating “how much you agree
or disagree with the speaker, and how much you think you
might like him. . . . this is really a survey of your own attitudes on the topics discussed in the tape.” Before the tape
was played, all subjects were instructed to read part of a professionally printed flyer which was included in the questionnaire booklet announcing a “symposium on the black in white
America.” It included one paragraph pertaining to the speaker
whom the subjects were about to hear.
The flyer described preregistration procedures for the symposium, listed the schedule of speakers, and gave a short one
paragraph biographical sketch of three of the symposium
speakers. The flyer was the same for the four Race × Status
manipulations except that the description of the second participant varied. That critical paragraph was circled by hand, with
the accompanying notation “read this section—this speaker will be heard on tape” hand written beside the paragraph.
The paragraph, in its four variations, appears below. (Italics are
presented here only to accentuate critical differences between
paragraphs and were not included in the study manipulations.)
White lower class: Thursday, 11:00. Mr. Donald Lindzey on “White Racism, Black Response.” Mr. Lindzey
grew up in rural Arkansas where his family worked as
sharecroppers. After reaching the eighth grade, he contributed to the support of his family by working at odd
jobs until joining in voter registration drives in Mississippi from 1966 to 1968. Largely self-educated since
then, Mr. Lindzey has been one of the few active white
lecturers on the topic of black power during the last few
years. His speaking has taken him throughout the United
States, including the Deep South.
White middle class: Thursday, 11:00. Mr. Donald Lindzey on “White Racism, Black Response.” Mr. Lindzey
grew up in a suburb of Little Rock, Arkansas. His father
was a lawyer. He attended the University of Michigan
for two years, majoring in sociology. He left Michigan
in 1966 to participate for two years in voter registration
drives in Mississippi. Mr. Lindzey has been one of the few
active white lecturers on the topic of black power during
the last few years. His speaking has taken him throughout
the United States, including the Deep South.
Black lower class: Thursday, 11:00. Mr. Howard
Washington on “White Racism, Black Response.” Mr.
Washington grew up in rural Arkansas where his family
worked as sharecroppers. After reaching the eighth grade
in an all black school, he contributed to the support of
his family by working at odd jobs until joining in voter registration in Mississippi from 1966 to 1968. Largely self-educated since then, Mr. Washington has been active in lecturing on the topic of black power during the
last two years; His speaking has taken him throughout
the United States, including the Deep South.
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Black middle class: Thursday, 11:00. Mr. Howard Washington on “White Racism, Black Response.”
Mr. Washington grew up in a predominantly white suburb of Little Rock, Arkansas, where his family was the
only black family in the neighborhood. His father was a
lawyer. He attended the University of Michigan for two
years, majoring in sociology. He left Michigan in 1966
to participate for two years in voter registration drives
in Mississippi. Mr. Washington has been an active lecturer on the topic of black power during the last two
years. His speaking has taken him throughout the United
States, including the Deep South.
That manipulation of communicator’s race and class status
formed, with sex of subject, a 2 × 2 × 2 factorial design.
For this second study, two different tapes were made,
one attributed to a black man named Howard Washington,
the second to a white man named Donald Lindzey. Several factors prompted this change from Study I. First, it is extremely difficult to make a single sound tape which is equally convincing as that of a white or black speaker. Second,
the introduction of vocal differences associated with race
would increase the power of the race manipulation. It was
felt that these considerations more than balanced the advantage of the clean experimental interpretation allowed by
the single-tape manipulation. The procedure necessitated,
of course, the running of two separate groups of subjects,
each hearing only one of those two critical audiotapes. Attempts to eliminate any selection bias between those two
groups included scheduling both sessions at a time in the
late afternoon when classes were few, and running the two
sessions with the second following immediately after the
first. Within each group, subjects of both sexes were randomly assigned to the status conditions. Strenuous attempts
were made to equate the two audiotapes on overall quality and emphasis. Specifically, although the verbal message
was quite controversial, both speakers maintained a calm
and paced delivery; this seemed appropriate in view of the
fact that the speech was supposedly delivered and recorded
at a university symposium.
The opinions on which subject agreement was assessed
had all been pretested (the previous semester) in written form
for agreement with an independent sample of basic psychology students. It was thus ascertained that a fairly wide rage
of statement acceptability was achieved. (Agreement ranged
from 4.95 to 2.28, respectively, on a 7-point belief similarity
scale from “identical” to “opposite” for items of “Black people do not want to move in with white people” and “Half of
every tax dollar from white people should go to support black
education, black social services, and black culture.”)
The tape recording lasted approximately five minutes,
though subjects were left with the impression that it was only
the first part of the communicator’s speech which was played
for them. Unlike Study I, the topics of the speech were restricted to issues of the black minority in a white culture. The
range of topics can be seen by the item headings on the first
seven items of Table 2.
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After the tape was played, subjects were instructed to turn
to the page in the questionnaire booklets which contained the
scaled items related to the speech. Instructions for the opinion similarity rating told subjects to “rate the similarity of your
own views to his views on the following topics. Base your ratings on what you heard Mr. Washington [or Mr. Lindzey] say
on the tape recording.” Ratings were made on the same Lykerttype 7-point scales with polar adjectives of “identical” and
“opposite” which were used in the pretest for Study II and in
Study I. The last of those scales asked subjects for a rating of
the general similarity of their values to those of the speaker.
Finally, five social distance and behavioral differential scales similar to some of those used in Study I were employed, with instructions to the subjects to “assume that you
had the opportunity to interact with him in the manner suggested by the question” in responding to those items. Those
scales form the last five items of Table 2.
After filling out that form, subjects were given a questionnaire meant to assess suspiciousness concerning any deception in the study. The form explained that subjects often “form
their Own explanations or hypotheses about what the experimenter is ‘really’ after,” and asked a series of open-ended
questions about what suspicions the subject had formed, how
certain he was of those suspicions, etc.
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Subjects were debriefed concerning the true nature and
purpose of the experiment.

Results
Of the 122 subjects who took part in the experiment, two were eliminated for suspiciousness that the tape recordings were not real. Subjects were randomly eliminated from seven of
the eight cells of the analysis of variance design
to achieve an equal number of subjects per cell,
bringing the number of subjects used in the analyses to 88 (there being 11 subjects in the smallest cell). It was felt that the rather large number of subjects still in the design would provide
an accurate assessment of the independent variable effects without necessitating the unweighted-means-type analysis used in Study I.
Table 2 presents the major results of Study
II. Results of communicator variables by subject sex are not included in that table since sex

158

D IENSTBIER

was never a significant interactive variable
with race or class. On 12 of the 13 similarity
and social distance variables, women subjects
tended to be more accepting and to see their
beliefs as more similar to the communicator’s
reversing only on the issue of election to political office. The only statistically significant effects related to sex were for the liking-if-met
item (mean liking by women = 4.20 compared
to 3.41 for men, F = 4.61, df = 1/80, p < .05)
and the accept-as-kin item (mean acceptance
by women = 4.30 compared to 3.41 for men, F
= 4.51, df = 1/80, p < .05).
Unlike Study I, in which status seemed the
most consistently reliable determinant of agreement variance (the communication in Study 1.
did not largely concern race-relevant issues),
the results of Study II indicated that communicator’s race was the single most powerful influence on variance for the similarity and social
distance scales. That finding is indicated strongly by greater agreement with and liking for
the white communicator in everyone of the 13
scales used in Study II. This race effect is significant for three of the eight similarity scales
(including the general similarity item), and for
all five of the social-distance-type measures.
Although the direction of the status differences were consistent with those of Study I,
with the middle-class communicator receiving
more favorable ratings on 12 of the 13 dependent measure scales, the differences are not statistically significant on any measure.
Finally, there are no statistically significant
Race × Class interactions.

DISCUSSION OF THE DATA
Between Study I and Study II, differences
existed (a) in the manner in which independent
variables of race and status were manipulated,
(b) in the content and style of communication
delivery, (c) in some of the dependent measure
scales, and (d) in the characteristics of the subject populations used. Yet, if the findings of the
two studies are broadly considered, it is possible to compare and contrast those findings.
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Across both studies, the manipulation of social class status resulted in subjects rating their
beliefs as less similar to the lower-class communicator, compared to the middle-class communicator. The topics discussed in the two
scripts of the two studies did not, of course,
exhaust possible and likely topic areas, and
in Study II, while the script was purposefully
made race relevant, no such effort was made
for relevancy to social class. Therefore, despite the consistency of the class findings, it is
expected that one could find topics for such research presentations with which even middleclass subjects would find more agreement with
the lower-class communicator.
Within Study I, communicator race and communication topic interacted, so that some issues
induced more agreement with the white communicator, while others resulted in the black receiving more agreement. The complexity of the
interactions between communicator characteristics and communication content is, therefore,
more evident with respect to race than class
variables. By restricting the range of the topics
used in Study II to a single class of race-relevant issues, it was predicted that the irregular
race-topic interaction found in Study I would
give way to a consistent unidirectional race effect; this was realized in Study II as the consistent tendency to agree more with (and to like
more) the white communicator.
Taken together, the two studies illustrate
that expectations which subjects have about
class are different from those about race, and
that a communication which is relevant to
class and/or race, and which is presented in a
fashion which permits interpretation latitude,
interacts in unique ways with those variables.
It is apparent from Study I that these interactions between information content and communicator-characteristic variables are mediated by subject characteristics associated with
expectencies, sets, or stereotypes relevant to
those communicator characteristics; this relationship was illustrated by the pattern of correlations between subject ethnocentrism and felt
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similarity toward the communicator. It is also
evident, particularly from the results of Study
I, that no simple formulation such as suggested
by congruity theory (Osgood & Tannenbaum,
1955) based only on the I valences of the communicator and the communication could account for the complex ways in which communication and communicator characteristics
interact. As illustrated by the behavioral differential and social distance measures of both
studies of this paper (as well as by Dienstbier,
1970; Triandis, 1961; Triandis & Davis, 1965),
the degree to which prejudice would be indicated as due to status or race would depend on
the dependent measures used to operationalize
that construct. It is difficult to avoid the suspicion that some circularity has crept into the
(reviewed) belief theory literature with respect
to the choice of dependent measures. Prejudice has often been operationally defined by
some dependent measures which have proven
to be more sensitive to the belief manipulation
than the race manipulation. to suggest, as did
Mezei (1971), that a more race-sensitive measure is unfair since it would be related to and
confounded with perceived social pressure is
on the one hand admitting the complexity of
prejudice, while on the other denying the importance of that complexity since it does not
fit the simpler belief theory.

IMPLICATIONS FOR A REVISED
BELIEF THEORY
The belief theory of prejudice suggests that
when we perceive an individual to be black,
then we make assumptions about his different
beliefs—it is these assumptions which account
for our negative feelings and our discriminatory
actions toward that individual. Not spelled out
in this formulation, but seemingly obvious, is
the stipulation that the belief areas about which
assumptions are made will be relevant to the individual’s race, or our stereotype of it. If we see
a black person we will not necessarily assume
that he is a communist, or an anarchist, or that
be believes anecdotal evidence is more valuable
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than experimental psychology in providing reliable information. Rather, the belief dimensions
upon which we might base our discrimination
would be relevant to our stereotypes about individuals of that race, and would, therefore, be
solidly in the areas about which we anticipate
nonconsensus with those individuals. It makes
little sense, then, to attempt to demonstrate that
racial differences of stimulus individuals have
little power to influence us when those stimulus
individuals are equated on a host of irrelevant
beliefs (as has been done so often in the cited
belief theory literature). This exercise can only
show us that race is not interactive with those
belief issues, and that subjects are reluctant to
respond negatively toward a racially labeled
stimulus person without some justification or
that they have no racial prejudice to begin with
(or are reluctant to show it), or that they are
making unwarranted assumptions about what
they should respond to, or that they do not believe the experimenter.
It is apparent that the theoretical and experimental considerations are (or should be) more
complex than suggested by the unidirectional conceptualizations of the belief theory researchers. The attempt to account for complex
constructs like prejudice on the basis of a single underlying principle cannot succeed. This
pattern of theory construction represents a way
of conceptualizing human behavior whose roots
lie plainly in an oversimplistic view of man.
It may indeed be true (and quite apparently is so) that one’s assumption that another individual will not validate one’s belief systems
will dispose one negatively toward that person. But it is equally true, as evidenced by the
present research; that when the belief information is relevant to racial issues, those assumptions of dissimilar beliefs are not always simply
and quickly allayed by the presentation of belief information. It appears from this data that
assumptions about belief differences are caused
by prejudice (read antipathy or negative affect)
just as it is also apparent from the belief theory research that prejudice is caused by assumptions about belief differences. In the first case
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the negative affect may exist for any number of
reasons, as indicated by Allport (1954) and discussed in the introduction to this paper. We are
not left with a choice between either race (i.e.,
responses to race not based on belief issues) or
belief to account for prejudice. There may indeed be times when a greater reliance on one
or the other of those constructs may provide us
greater success in the prediction, understanding, and control of certain behaviors, but these
are concepts so different in structure that they
can neither be logically compared for relative
strength nor can they be heuristically seen as
hierarchically arranged. They hold, instead, relationships with each other most fruitfully seen
as mutually causal or interactive. To lose sight
of this mutual causation is to oversimplify the
area of prejudice, with the ultimate result that
our laboratory studies will have less and less
relevance for the real world.
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